of common, Valverde argues, is imperative: it directs populations to know things and makes them responsible for this knowledge whether they possess it or not. In this way, the state 'externalizes the ... duty to know and to manage the risks of urban disorder by delegating it to nontechnical, nonexpert personnel.' Valverde also argues that regulation of social order is slowly moving from a focus on particular deviant acts (like sodomy and public lewdness) or deviant identities (like homosexuality or alcoholism) to concepts like 'lifestyle,' 'habit,' and 'community.' Instead of regulating drunkards, for example, one regulates elements of the presumed habits or lifestyle of people who the state believes drink too much and cause social disorder by, for example, regulating the hours that pubs can remain open. Instead of throwing soldiers out of the military if they commit sodomy, the 'Don't Ask Don't Tell' policy excludes them if they have the 'propensity' to commit homosexual acts.
Valverde's book is a contribution to the sociology of legal knowledge. But it offers no general theory. She contends that the ways that legal officials know things are multiple and hybrid. Therefore her book is a series of short essays on different problems of vice regulation and social control, and the different forms of knowledge employed in each case. Nevertheless, the book is larger than the sum of its parts. Within its pages are the beginnings of a more general technique for studying how legal knowledge works and the work that it does. Vice is a particularly good place to begin this study; but the examples in this book suggest that Valverde's methods can be extended with profit to many other areas of legal regulation as well. ( We live in an era characterized by national and international attempts to address racism, sexism, and other human rights abuses. In such a context, it is natural to ask how we can/should rectify the injustices suffered in the course of such abuse. This is the difficult question addressed in this timely collection of essays and case studies. In trying to answer it, a variety of authors mix theoretical considerations with the discussion of concrete examples among them, reconciliation in South Africa and the new Russia, peace building in Haiti, and Canada's attempt to address the grievances of Aboriginal Canadians.
Many of the essays are provocative and intriguing. Some of them demonstrate a profound willingness to address difficult and unwelcome issues. Carol Prager wrestles with our instinctual judgment of those who commit atrocities like the Holocaust (whom we tend to see as 'moral monsters'), arguing that this reaction militates against understanding, and acts as an impediment to healing and reconciliation. In a sceptical essay on foreign intervention, Tom Keating argues that Western governments who intervene in the affairs of other nations impose Western models of social, political, and economic organization on developing societies; that their actions are burdened by difficult practical, political, fiscal, and epistemological constraints; and that they often exacerbate rather than alleviate the volatile situations they address.
Though the essays are of high quality, they form an uneasy whole. Larry May's discussion of mass rape and international crime is an incisive attempt to conceptualize international crime, but one wonders why it is included in a discussion of the details of reconciliation. Marc Forget's informative account of 'restorative justice' is closer to the mark, but it discusses the reconciliation of individual criminal offenders and their victims (and communities), a subject which raises very different issues from the reconciliation of different ethnic groups and peoples.
The problems which arise when one slides from individual to group reconciliation are evident in Trudy Govier's discussion of 'acknowledgment' and Aboriginal issues in Canada. In the course of her discussion, she repeatedly suggests that Canadians should acknowledge their collective and individual responsibility for past wrongs to Aboriginal peoples. It is difficult to argue with her suggestion that Canadians have a duty to address the issues of aboriginal groups, but one wonders if this is best accomplished by questionable claims of accountability claims which assign responsibility for acts of abuse to individuals who are, at best, distantly related to those individuals who committed the acts in question.
Many other pressing questions of reconciliation are enumerated by David Crocker in his normative framework for 'reckoning with past wrongs.' Instead of emancipating us, might attempts at reconciliation mire us in the actions of the past? How can we be sure that such attempts will not precipitate cycles of vengeance and interminable disagreement? When past abuses are serious (and sometimes heinous), is it humanly possible to reconcile victims and perpetrators? How do we ensure that reconciliation does not function as a means of forgiving individuals who should not be forgiven? How can one know, outside the rigours of a court system, that those accused of wrongs are treated fairly (especially in cases in which victims have interests that are served by exaggerated accusations)?
In her account of reconciliation 'for realists,' Susan Dwyer attempts to deal with some of these issues by developing a weaker notion of reconciliation that is possible when forgiveness is not an option. In his conclusion to the book, Justice Richard J. Goldstone musters a rousing optimism which is fuelled by the strides that he has witnessed in the work of international courts. Though there is much in what he says, many of his remarks address issues of justice rather than reconciliation, and readers of the present volume may be more impressed by its eloquent account of the psychological, political, and practical impediments to successful reconciliation. Samantha Brennan has assembled a strong collection of ten diverse essays. They all bring feminist perspectives to topics in moral philosophy, broadly conceived to include questions in epistemology (such as Rebecca Kukla's essay on the nature of moral perception) and politics (for instance, Susan Sherwin's recommendations for policy around reproductive technology). While some readers might expect feminist philosophers to be sharply critical of much of the history of philosophy, only one of the essays (by Nancy Snow) devotes substantial space to critique of the tradition. More of the essays argue for the ongoing importance of male canonical figures such as Kant and Aristotle to feminist projects while also signalling ways in which these philosophies need to be criticized or transformed. Many of the essays concern issues about agency or autonomy (how we should think of it, what makes it possible, how oppression may limit it). Carolyn McLeod argues both that there are degrees of objectification (such that a woman may be viewed both as an interchangeable sexual object and as an accomplished tennis player, for example) and that philosophers, feminist and otherwise, need to attend to these different degrees if they are to understand the full impact of oppressive practices on our capacity to act as authors of our lives. Ruth Sample asks exactly what constitutes sexual exploitation and argues that exploitation, sexual or otherwise, involves taking advantage of another's vulnerability in a way that fails to value or respect their personhood. Her essay concludes that prostitution might not always be morally wrong, but that it is wrong under conditions of patriarchy which limit women's options and affect what they see as valuable about themselves. Many of the essays on this theme share a commitment to viewing selves as relational, or irreducibly social, such that personal relations and social group membership affect one's self-understanding, options, and capacity for action.
Some of the essays in this volume are valuable contributions to longstanding debates (for instance, about how to understand the virtues, or how to understand Kant's ethics). In one such essay Lara Denis argues that Kant's emphasis on duties to oneself can be a useful corrective to women's tendency to interpret morality solely in terms of service to others. In particular she focuses on the feminist implications of Kant's duty to avoid degrading one's self. In another, Rebecca Kukla carefully distin-
